Difference between revisions of "Introduction"
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The second considers privacy to be the right "of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extend information about them is communicated to others." (Westin, 1967). In other words, privacy is the right to ''informational self-determination''. | The second considers privacy to be the right "of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extend information about them is communicated to others." (Westin, 1967). In other words, privacy is the right to ''informational self-determination''. | ||
− | The third (Nissenbaum, | + | The third views the right to privacy in terms of dichotomies, as a right to prevent information to flow from one context to another (Nissenbaum, 2004). In this theory, privacy equals a right to ''contextual integrity''. |
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− | In this theory, privacy equals ''contextual integrity''. | ||
The forth considers that "privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity" (Agre and Rottenberg, 2001). This views privacy as a ''freedom from constraints''. | The forth considers that "privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity" (Agre and Rottenberg, 2001). This views privacy as a ''freedom from constraints''. | ||
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Latest revision as of 16:00, 20 November 2011
Several conceptualisations of privacy exist.
The first considers privacy to be "the right to be let alone" (Warren and Brandeis, 1890). Thus, privacy is the right to social retreat.
The second considers privacy to be the right "of individuals, groups and institutions to determine for themselves when, how and to what extend information about them is communicated to others." (Westin, 1967). In other words, privacy is the right to informational self-determination.
The third views the right to privacy in terms of dichotomies, as a right to prevent information to flow from one context to another (Nissenbaum, 2004). In this theory, privacy equals a right to contextual integrity.
The forth considers that "privacy is the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the construction of one’s identity" (Agre and Rottenberg, 2001). This views privacy as a freedom from constraints.